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INTRODUCTION
One of the most obvious and important trends of the past decade
has been the increasing importance of regional economic integration,
achieved primarily through the formation of free trade areas. While the
debate over the welfare effects of regional integration agreements (RIAs)
and their dynamic effects on the world trading system remain unresolved,
empirical analyses of NAFTA suggest they have been welfare increasing
(Burfisher and Jones, eds. 1998; Krueger 1999; Panagariya 2000). How-
ever increased trade, especially in import sensitive raw agricultural prod-
ucts, often results in protectionist pressure that politicians have trouble
resisting, free trade area or not. Largely for this reason most RIAs, includ-
ing the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) include agriculture specific safe-
guard provisions that allow members to legally restrict import surges un-
der specified conditions.1 These agriculture specific safeguards do not re-
quire evidence of injury in the importing country, even though the more
____________________
1  The agricultural safeguard (emergency) provisions in CUSTA applied only to fruits
and vegetables. In NAFTA, the agricultural emergency provisions apply to a short list
of commodities specified in NAFTA’s Annex 703.3.233
general safeguard provisions of the CUSTA and NAFTA do require an
injury determination. However, the safeguard (emergency) provisions of
the CUSTA and NAFTA apply only during the implementation periods of
the agreements.
At the multilateral level, the World Trade Organization (WTO) also
allows members to legally curtail imports. WTO members have a number
of legal ways to respond to unwanted imports:
• renegotiate bound tariffs;
• raise tariffs from applied to bound rates;
• use restrictive import measures for balance of payments reasons;
• apply the WTO safeguard mechanism under the Special Safe-
guards provision of the Agreement on Agriculture;
• apply the WTO safeguard mechanism under the Agreement on
Safeguards;
• apply countervailing duties; and
• apply anti-dumping duties.
The first three ways are rarely used. In the fourth, the special agri-
cultural safeguard applies only to those commodities “tariffied” during the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. In the fifth, the WTO safeguard
mechanism requires proof that the imports are causing or are threatening
to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. None of the first five ap-
proaches to curtail imports suggests that the imports are “unfair.” The last
two remedies, which are often called administered protection, allow coun-
tries to respond to “unfair” imports.
In this paper we focus on administered protection since it is widely
believed to be the instrument of choice for protectionist domestic indus-
tries, when tariffs are lowered or eliminated. The use of administered pro-
tection was for a long time the exclusive purview of the developed world,
but this is no longer the case. Lindsey and Ikenson (2001) report that in
1995, among the top ten countries using anti-dumping (AD) measures, 72
percent of the 874 AD measures in place were in the United States (35
percent), the European Union (16 percent), Canada (11 percent) and Aus-
tralia (10 percent). By 2000, these four countries accounted for only 55
Young,Wainio, and Meilke234 Keeping the Borders Open
percent of antidumping measures. India accounted for less than 2 percent
of the AD measures in 1995, however in 2000 it accounted for 9 percent,
more than either Australia or Canada. Clearly, developing countries have
learned from the developed world how to use administered protection to
inhibit imports.2
The objective of this paper is to examine four questions regarding
administered protection, especially as it applies to members of NAFTA:
1. What is the economic rationale for administered protection and
does it continue to hold true in the context of the NAFTA?
2. What is the evidence on the use of administered protection
• by the NAFTA countries against each other,
• by NAFTA countries against third countries, and
• by third countries against NAFTA members?
3. How can administered protection laws be changed to improve
the ability of NAFTA members to actually resolve disputes?
4. Are there reasonable alternatives to administered protection
within NAFTA?
Before proceeding it is important to understand two key dimen-
sions of administered protection law. The WTO rules governing adminis-
tered protection are not self-executing. The procedures must be incorpo-
rated into domestic legislation and applied by national administered pro-
tection agencies. Hence, while the rules governing administered protec-
tion in different countries are similar, they are not necessarily identical
(Leycegui, Robson and Stein 1995). Second, administered protection rules
cover all products. The rules must be sufficiently robust to cover cases
involving commodities as distinct in their production practices and mar-
keting arrangements as steel, cut flowers, collated roofing nails and hogs.
The chances of developing administered protection rules specific to agri-
culture seem so remote as not to deserve attention. Both of these facts put
constraints on the type of reforms agriculturalists can hope for.
____________________
2  Interestingly, Mexico had ten percent of AD measures in 1995 but only seven percent
in 2000.235
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR ADMINISTERED PROTECTION
Administered protection is a generic term that covers antidumping
duties, countervailing duties and a variety of trade actions that can be
brought under domestic laws for import relief (Congressional Budget Of-
fice, 2001; U.S. International Trade Commission, 1998). Our concern is
solely with AD and countervailing duty (CV) actions.
AD actions are brought against firms in foreign countries that are
selling in the domestic market at prices below those charged in the home
country, or more often, below their full cost of production including a
margin for profit. The stated goal of AD law is to combat predatory pric-
ing, but complainants have to prove only that the firm is dumping, and not
that it is engaged in predatory pricing. Predatory pricing involves a firm
selling below its cost of production to drive out rival firms, thereby creat-
ing a monopoly position. The firm’s monopoly position then allows it to
subsequently raise prices above those that prevailed during the “preda-
tory” period and above competitive levels. This type of firm behavior stifles
competition and is welfare decreasing. However, it is widely believed that
successful predatory pricing is extremely rare. Shin (1994), in her study of
282 antidumping cases, could find only 10 percent that were consistent
with predatory pricing. Successful predatory pricing of agricultural prod-
ucts, especially raw agricultural products seems even more remote be-
cause there are few commodity specific resources involved in the produc-
tion of most agricultural commodities, and entry is easy and relatively
inexpensive. While predatory pricing might be easier for firms that pro-
cess agricultural products, it is hard to believe it is common given the
ability of consumers to substitute products in consumption and given the
number of alternative foreign suppliers.
The economic essence of predatory pricing is the ability to price
discriminate among markets. For a firm to successfully price discriminate
among domestic and foreign markets, it needs to be able to protect the
“high” price in the domestic market either through tariff or non-tariff bar-
riers. NAFTA eliminated nearly all tariffs following the implementation
period and most non-tariff barriers have also been removed. As a conse-
Young,Wainio, and Meilke236 Keeping the Borders Open
quence, most of the protection of the domestic market that a firm needs to
engage successfully in predatory pricing has been eliminated. As a conse-
quence, a NAFTA member imposing an AD duty is simply depriving its
consumers of a product available to other members of NAFTA at a lower
price. This welfare decreasing action discourages, rather than encourages,
competition.
As shown later in the paper, an industry bringing a complaint in a
NAFTA country has more than a 50 percent chance of obtaining formal
import relief. In addition, AD duties tend to be large once put into place.3
This situation is especially true for cyclical agricultural products where
selling below the full cost of production is not an uneconomic or unusual
activity. As Lindsey (1999, p. 19) argues, “Yet in actual practice, the meth-
ods of determining dumping under the law fail, repeatedly and at multiple
levels, to distinguish between normal commercial pricing practices and
those that reflect government-caused market distortions.” It is difficult to
make the general case for antidumping measures and perhaps impossible
to make the case within a free trade area. In essence, firms are punished for
taking actions in foreign markets that are considered normal practice in the
domestic market.
The economic basis for a CV action is different than for an AD
action. An AD case is brought by domestic producers against foreign firms
who are alleged to be engaging in unfair pricing practices. A CV action is
brought by domestic producers against foreign producers who are alleged
to benefit from unfairly provided government subsidies. Horlick (1991,
p.137) notes that there is “a grain of truth, which is the distortion caused
by subsidies lying behind the rationale for a CV, while AD actions are 90
percent pure protectionist.”
In a free trade area where the member governments have differing
domestic policies, countervailing duties are weapons that can be used to
offset the trade-distorting effects of one member’s policies on other mem-
____________________
3  Even in situations where the complainant losses the case, the uncertainty resulting
from the investigation and temporary import duties can severely restrict trade.237
bers. However, CD actions, or their threat, are often used to harass foreign
producers when there is little evidence of injury. Meilke and Sarker (1997)
argue that national administered protection agencies need to be reformed
to act more as “transparency agents” and “investigatory agents” acting in
the public good, and less as “advocacy” agents for domestic protectionist
interests.
A countervailing duty is a tariff. The welfare effects of a tariff and
hence a CV are well known to economists. However, van Duren (1991)
and Moschini and Meilke (1992) raise a number of important issues in the
context of administered protection. Is the objective of the CV to restore
trade flows and prices of the subsidized product to free trade levels? Is it to
restore welfare to the free trade level in the importing country? Or is it to
convince the offending country to remove its offending policies? A trade
lawyer will argue that eliminating the offending policies is the goal of
administered protection. This goal is accomplished by punishing foreign
producers, and at the same time domestic consumers. If the objective is
only to remove the injury caused by the unfair imports, then the CV should
almost always be less than the measured subsidy (van Duren 1991; Meilke
and Sarker 1997), and it may need to be applied to both raw and processed
products (Moschini and Meilke 1992).4
The economic cost of administered protection to both the import-
ing and exporting countries can be substantial, despite the small number
of products affected at any one time. The producers in exporting nations
face the out-of-pocket cost of defending themselves in the trade action.
Lawyers and economic consultants are not cheap, and trade actions tend
not to go away.5 Producers in the importing country face the same litiga-
tion costs but if the rent seeking results in a CV they are usually hand-
____________________
4  If the goal is to restore the price and trade flows of the subsidized product to free trade
levels, then a CV on that product is sufficient. However, if the subsidized product is a
significant input (swine and pork) into the production of another product, duties are
required on both the raw and the processed product to restore welfare in the importing
country.
5  Canadian hog producers spent 15 years defending themselves in the U.S. CV action
against Canadian swine.
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somely repaid. On top of these costs are the economic efficiency losses
associated with the AD and countervailing duties. The ITC (USITC, 1995),
in a comprehensive analysis of the economic effects of AD and CV actions
in the United States, calculated a net welfare loss of $1.59 billion and job
losses of 4,075 in the affected sectors. These numbers amount to about
$39,000/worker transferred from employment in the affected sector to al-
ternative employment elsewhere in the economy.6
In the next section we turn to the question of just how important
are administered protection actions in NAFTA countries, with an emphasis
on agricultural products. Following that section, we turn to the question of
how to modify current administered protection rules and institutions.
PREVALENCE OF TRADE REMEDY INVESTIGATIONS BY NAFTA
COUNTRIES
The use of AD duties and CVs to prevent or to remedy unfair trade
practices was an important issue during both the CUSTA and NAFTA ne-
gotiations. During the CUSTA talks, the United States was urged to con-
sider alternatives to its national trade remedy laws. In particular, Canada
sought agreement that each country would exempt the other from existing
national AD and CV laws and replace them with a new set of disciplines
modeled on competition law principles with a binational tribunal to en-
force them. For a number of reasons, CUSTA produced no substantive
changes in the trade remedy laws of either country. During the NAFTA
negotiations, Mexico pursued having the United States suspend or make
changes to its trade remedy laws and practices, again with no success.
The concern shared by Canada and Mexico countries was that as
traditional trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas were eliminated, pro-
ducers in the United States would turn their attention toward trade remedy
actions as a way to relieve pressure from import competition. This concern
was not unwarranted, since at the time that these agreements were being
negotiated, the United States was the heaviest user of trade remedy actions
____________________
6  The general equilibrium model used by the ITC assumed full employment.239
by virtually every indicator. It ranked first in the average number of cases
initiated per year, average number of measures imposed per year, and num-
ber of active measures in place. In this section we quantify and analyze the
pre- and post-agreements incidence of AD and CV actions by NAFTA
countries, focusing on actions taken against products in the food and agri-
cultural sector.
GLOBAL USE OF TRADE REMEDY LAWS BY NAFTA COUNTRIES
Between 1984, five years before the beginning of CUSTA, and
mid-2001, the United States, Canada, and Mexico initiated a total of 1,592
unfair trade practice investigations (Figure 1). About 83 percent (1,314)
involved alleged dumping while 18 percent (278) involved subsidies. In
global terms, NAFTA partners accounted for 35 percent of all AD investi-
gations and 66 percent of all CV investigations notified to the WTO.7 The
United States alone accounted for 20 percent (749) of all AD investiga-
tions and 55 percent (243) of all CV investigations during this period,
making it the heaviest user of trade remedy laws in the world. Canada and
Mexico, however, are also frequent users. Canada was the fourth most
active initiator with a total of 358 AD and CV cases opened, accounting
for about 8 percent of the global total. Mexico quickly joined the ranks of
main users and was fifth with 242 cases initiated, 6 percent of the global
total during this period, even though it did not initiate its first trade remedy
action until 1987.
For the United States and Canada, 1992 was the year of greatest
activity for initiations. The number of cases opened in each country was
over twice the yearly average for the period. It was also a year of heavy
protectionist tendencies in a number of other countries due to a cyclical
downturn in commodity markets. The following year, 1993 was the most
active for initiations of investigations by Mexico—82 cases, or 35 percent
of Mexico’s total. This spike in activity was largely attributed to a combi-
____________________
7  Because of numerous errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the way countries
notify their trade remedy actions to the GATT/WTO, these numbers and proportions
are not exact. They are, however, broadly illustrative of the level of administered
protection found in each country.
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nation of an overvalued exchange rate and continued low commodity prices
(Miranda 1995). The popularity of AD and CV actions in all three coun-
tries waned in the mid-1990s. In 1996, when commodity prices were high,
Figure 1: AD and CVD cases initiated by NAFTA countries, January
1984 to June 2001.
Figure 2: AD and CVD measures imposed by NAFTA Countries,
January 1, 1984 to June 30, 2001.
Source:  Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (2002); Congressional Budget Office (2001); Miranda, Torres and Ruiz (1998); Miranda
(1995); U.S. International Trade Commission (1983–1989); U.S. International Trade Administration (1984–2001); World Trade
Organization (2002).
Source:  Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (2002); Congressional Budget Office (2001); Miranda, Torres and Ruiz (1998); Miranda
(1995); U.S. International Trade Commission (1983–1989); U.S. International Trade Administration (1984–2001); World Trade
Organization (2002).241
the number of cases opened was less than a fifth the number in 1992.
Since then the level of activity has begun to pick up.
The proportion of the global total attributed to NAFTA countries
increases slightly when administered protection activity is quantified on
the basis of final measures imposed (Figure 2).8 On a global basis, final
measures, in the form of either duties or price undertakings, were imposed
in 2,155 of the 4,170 cases opened between 1984 and 2001, 52 percent of
the time.9 The United States imposed more new measures than any other
country, an average of almost 31 per year, representing a quarter of the
reported total world average. Canada accounted for 11 percent and Mexico
6 percent. In all three countries, the chances that an investigation resulted
in the imposition of a duty or price undertaking exceeded the world aver-
age. In Mexico final measures were imposed in 52 percent of cases, in the
United States 54 percent, and in Canada 68 percent. These data mean that
every time the investigating authorities in Canada pursued a case against
alleged dumping or subsidization, the accused party had only a 32 percent
chance of obtaining a favorable ruling. It bears pointing out that even
when a case results in a final determination of no dumping or subsidiza-
tion or a finding of no injury, the investigating country may have imposed
a preliminary duty. These preliminary duties and, in some cases, the initia-
tion of an investigation, can have a chilling effect on trade, causing im-
ports to drop. In addition, firms or countries subject to AD or CV investiga-
tions incur considerable expense in defending themselves.
On June 30, 2001, there were 1,126 AD and 87 CV orders in place
around the world (Table 1). These orders are only a fraction of the over
2,000 cases that resulted in the imposition of a duty or price undertaking
____________________
8  The calculations presented here compare measures initiated with measures imposed
during the period, regardless of the date of initiation of the cases from which the
measures derive. Some measures in the early years stem from cases initiated before
1984, while some cases initiated late in the period had not yet been completed, so no
measure is reported.
9  Price undertakings are provided for under the GATT/WTO rules. Put simply, they
refer to the situation where an individual exporter reaches an agreement with the
investigating authorities of the importing country to raise their export price to a level
sufficiently high to eliminate injury.
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since 1984. Many of these orders have since been revoked or suspended.
Canada ranked fifth in the world in active measures, accounting for 8 per-
cent of the reported world total. This percent share is well below the 11
percent share of all measures imposed by Canada, indicating a greater
propensity to revoke measures over time. Mexico, which accounted for 6
percent of all measures imposed during the period also accounted for 6
percent of active measures at the end of the period.
The United States, which is the most frequent user of trade remedy
laws by the active measure indicator, has seen its share of the total stock
drop from 33 percent (390 measures in place) in 1999 to 23 percent (284
Table 1: Active Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures
in the World as of June 30, 2001.
Reporting Party     Antidumping  Countervailing    Total     Percent of Total
Argentina 46 3 49 4
Australia 56 6 62 5
Brazil 52 52 4
Canada 89 9 98 8
Czech Republic 1 1 0
Egypt 10 10 1
European 219 19 238 20
    Communities
India 121 121 10
Israel 4 4 0
Jamaica 1 1 0
Korea 29 29 2
Malaysia 8 8 1
Mexico 66 1 67 6
New Zealand 11 2 13 1
Peru 15 15 1
Singapore 2 2 0
South Africa 110 1 111 9
Thailand 6 6 0
Trinidad and Tobago 5 5 0
Turkey 15 15 1
United States 241 43 284 23
Venezuela 19 3 22 2
Total 1126 87 1213 100
Source:  WTO (2002).243
measures) as of June 30, 2001. Before the Uruguay Round, a large pro-
portion of U.S. AD orders were considered by exporters to be effectively
permanent. According to a U.S. government study, exporters found it al-
most impossible to get an order removed once applied, and the United
States had no provision for regular “sunset” reviews and terminations of
AD and CV measures (Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The Uruguay
Round required the United States to complete sunset reviews of active
measures and terminate those measures no longer applicable by January
1, 2000.10  As a result, on January 1, 2000, the U.S. stock of active mea-
sures dropped over one quarter, from 390 to 285.
The Uruguay Round sunset provisions also resulted in a large drop
in the average duration of U.S. orders. Nevertheless, this average is still
quite high as U.S. orders tend to remain in place much longer than those
imposed by other countries. The average duration of the 241 active U.S.
AD orders in place on June 30, 2001 was 8.3 years, with nine orders hav-
ing been in effect for over 20 years (Table 2). The average duration for the
____________________
10  The Uruguay Round established rules for the duration of AD and CV measures and
requirements for periodic review of the continuing need, if any, for the imposition of
duties or price undertakings. The “sunset” requirement established that duties shall
normally terminate no later than five years after first being applied, unless a review
investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidization and injury. This five-
year “sunset” provision also applies to price undertakings.
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TTable 2: The Number and Duration of Active Measures by NAFTA
Countries, June 30, 2001.
                                              Active   Duration in Years
                                                Measures       Mean    Median    Maximum
Antidumping Measures
United States 241 8.3 7.8 27.5
Canada 89 5.1 3.7 19.2
Mexico 66 2.8 2.6 5.9
Countervailing Duty Measures
United States 43 7.0 7.8 22.9
Canada 9 5.6 1.0 16.8
Mexico 1 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source:  WTO (2002).244 Keeping the Borders Open
43 active U.S. CV orders was a bit lower at seven years, with one order
having been in place over 20 years. In the case of both AD and CV orders,
the median duration was 7.8 years.
Canada also has some long-lived orders, with an average duration
of 5.1 years for the 89 AD orders in place, including one in effect over 19
years. Canada had two CV orders that have survived almost 17 years.11
The average duration for Canada’s nine active CVD orders was 5.6 years.
Of the three NAFTA partners, Mexico’s active orders have the shortest
duration, not surprising since Mexico did not conduct its first AD investi-
gation until 1987 or its first CVD investigation until 1990. Mexico’s 66
active AD measures had an average duration of only 2.8 years, with only
12 having been in place five years or more. In the case of the United
States, 18 percent of its active measures on June 30, 2001 had been put
into effect during the last two years, versus 38 percent for Canada and 43
percent for Mexico.12
Impact of CUSTA and NAFTA
Before CUSTA and NAFTA were implemented, some believed that
pressure to adjust to increased competition brought on by free trade would
result in producers, particularly U.S. producers, pressuring their govern-
ments to regulate this trade. The argument was that if no efforts were made
to address the problems that originally compelled governments to impose
trade barriers, removal of these barriers would result in increased efforts to
seek relief available under trade remedy laws. Comparing the number of
cases initiated before and after each agreement should provide some indi-
cation of whether the lowering of trade barriers had an effect on how ag-
gressively each country investigated alleged unfair trading practices.
____________________
11  
The United States and Canada are the only countries in the world having active
measures that have been in place over 15 years.
12  One would expect that a country that has enacted most of its measures only recently
would have a shorter mean and median duration even though its recent measures could
end up lasting a long time. A better measure of the expected duration of a measure
would be to calculate the mean duration of measures that have been terminated.245
The United States and Canada were both more frequent users of
trade remedy law against each other during the five years prior to the for-
mation of CUSTA (1989–1993), than during the first five years of the
agreement. Between 1984 and 1988, the United States opened 24 investi-
gations of Canadian imports while Canada opened 29 investigations of
imports from the United States (Table 3). These numbers declined to 18
and 25 during the 1989 to 1993 period. Canada showed a slightly greater
propensity to investigate the United States than the reverse before the agree-
ment. This difference widened slightly after the agreement.
How do these numbers compare with investigations against non-
CUSTA countries on a trade basis? In the five years prior to CUSTA, inves-
tigations of Canadian imports by the United States accounted for 6.4 per-
cent of the U.S. total. In comparison, Canada accounted for 18.9 percent
of U.S. merchandise imports during this period. In the five years after,
Canada accounted for a slightly smaller proportion (6.0 percent) of all
U.S. cases, while its share of the U.S. import market dropped slightly to
18.7 percent. Contrary to Canada’s concerns, the number of investigations
decreased both in absolute and percentage terms. During the same time,
the proportion of all Canadian AD and CD investigations that were di-
rected at U.S. imports remained steady at 22.3 percent, while the share of
Canadian merchandise imports held by the United States increased from a
five-year average of 68.6 percent before the agreement to 71.7 percent
after the agreement.
The picture is similar when bilateral investigations between the
United States and Mexico are considered before and after NAFTA (Table
4). During the five years before NAFTA (1989–1993), the United States
initiated 13 AD and CV cases against Mexican imports while Mexico initi-
ated twice that number against U.S. imports. During the first five years of
the Agreement, the number of cases each country launched against the
other declined 50 percent. This decline was taking place even though the
value of bilateral trade was growing rapidly. Between the two periods, the
average share of Mexican imports in the U.S. market increased from 6.4
percent to 9.2 percent, while the share of U.S. imports in the Mexican
market increased from 71.1 percent to 73.8 percent.
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During most of the 1984 to 2001 period, NAFTA countries were
the subject of far fewer investigations by their bloc partners than their im-
port shares might predict. Table 5 shows the number of bilateral cases
initiated and defended by each country during this period. Only 14 per-
cent of the total investigations initiated by NAFTA countries were directed
at a bloc partner. Eight percent of total U.S. investigations were directed
against NAFTA partners, compared with 21 percent by Canada and 28
percent by Mexico. Of the 190 trade remedy cases initiated by one NAFTA
country against another during the period under review, the United States
opened the least amount—60 or 32 percent of the total—but was the larg-
est defender. The United States was the target of 122 investigations by its
NAFTA partners during the period, or 64 percent of the total.
Clearly, neither agreement has resulted in an explosion of AD and
CV cases by the United States against its bloc partners, nor by them against
the United States. Rather, the agreements seem to have moderated the num-
ber of trade remedy actions between the countries. Nevertheless, in some
sectors, including agriculture, trade disputes between these countries ap-
pear to have grown in frequency and intensity since the two agreements
Table 5: Bilateral AD and CVD Investigations within NAFTA, January 1,
1984 to June 30, 2001.
        Initiating Country NAFTA
United States Canada Mexico Total
Affected Country
United States 0 65 57 122
Canada 36 0 4 40
Mexico 24 4 0 28
NAFTA Totals 60 69 61 190
Global Totals 761 334 219 1314
NAFTA/Global 8% 21% 28% 14%
Percent of NAFTA Total
United States 0 34 30 64
Canada 19 0 2 21
Mexico 13 2 0 15
NAFTA Totals 32 36 32 1
Source: Cases - U.S.: U.S. International Trade Administration (1984–2001);
Canada:  Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (2002);  Mexico: U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Administration (1990–1996); Also World Trade Organization (2002).249
were implemented. We focus next on AD and CV actions within the agri-
cultural sector, to determine if they provide any indication of how the level
of trade tension has changed during this time.
TRADE REMEDY ACTIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
While most agricultural trade within NAFTA flows smoothly and is
taken for granted, a small portion continues to generate disputes, many of
which have involved allegations of dumping or subsidization. In fact, the
agricultural sectors in NAFTA countries have been much more frequent
users of AD and CV laws to contest imports from bloc partners than from
non-bloc partners. A comparison of Tables 5 and 6 reveals that of the 190
trade remedy cases initiated by one NAFTA country against another dur-
ing the period under review, 41 (22 percent) were directed at agricultural
imports (Table 6). By comparison, of the 1,402 cases initiated by the three
against non-NAFTA countries, only 78, or about 5.6 percent, were agricul-
tural.
Table 6: Bilateral AD and CVD Investigations on Agricultural Imports
within NAFTA, January 1, 1984 and June 30, 2001.
        Initiating Country NAFTA
United States Canada Mexico Total
Affected Country
United States 0 18 10 28
Canada 9 0 0 9
Mexico 4 0 0 4
NAFTA Totals 13 18 10 41
Global Totals 71 32 16 119
NAFTA/Global 18% 56% 63% 34%
Percent of NAFTA Total
United States 0 44 24 68
Canada 22 0 0 22
Mexico 10 0 0 10
NAFTA Totals 32 44 24 1
Source: Cases - U.S.: U.S. International Trade Administration (1984–2001).
Canada: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (2002). Mexico: U.S. International
Trade Administration (1984–2001); Also World Trade Organization (2002).
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All of the agricultural actions have involved the United States as
either the investigator or the target of the action. The United States has
been the target in 68 percent of the cases and the initiator in 32 percent.
Canada has been the heaviest user of trade remedy actions against its NAFTA
partners in the agricultural sector, accounting for 44 percent of all cases
investigated. Canada was the only country that opened more agricultural
cases against NAFTA partners (all against the United States) than against
non-NAFTA partners. Of the 71 agricultural cases investigated by the United
States, only 13 involved NAFTA partners. Ten of Mexico’s 23 agricultural
cases were directed at U.S. imports.
Appendix Table 1 provides an inventory of every agricultural case
initiated by one NAFTA partner against another between 1984 and 2001,
as well as a few cases that were initiated before 1984 but active during this
time period. Of the 32 bilateral cases between the United States and Canada,
15 were initiated before CUSTA was in place, seven by the United States
and eight by Canada. Definitive duties or undertakings were imposed in
all but two of these cases. Since CUSTA began, Canada has initiated 13
AD and CV cases against U.S. agricultural imports while the United States
has initiated four cases against Canada.13  
Of the 14 cases completed, only
six resulted in duties.
For bilateral cases between the United States and Mexico, only
three of the 15 were opened before NAFTA, two by the United States and
one by Mexico. Only one of these resulted in a duty. Since NAFTA, the
United States has investigated Mexican agricultural imports three times
while Mexico has initiated nine investigations against the United States. Of
the ten cases that have been completed, six have resulted in duties or un-
dertakings.
In general, it appears that the United States has decreased the fre-
quency with which it has used its trade remedy laws in the agricultural
____________________
13  On October 23, 2000, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investi-
gation of Canadian wheat marketing practices; on October 15, 2002 he announced
that he would be examining the possibilities of filing AD and CV petitions with the
U.S. DOC.251
sector since CUSTA and NAFTA have been in place. CUSTA does not
seem to have had any perceptible impact on the frequency of Canadian
initiations, although the chances of an investigation resulting in a duty or
undertaking have decreased. Mexico, on the other hand, has seen a large
increase in cases within the agricultural sector. Prior to NAFTA, only one
of Mexico’s 26 cases opened against the United States was against agricul-
tural imports. Since NAFTA, seven of the 13 cases by Mexico against the
United States have been against agricultural imports.
As of June 30, 2001, the three countries had a total of 39 active
measures against agricultural imports (out of a total 449 active measures).
As shown in Table 7, the United States had 20 active measures against
agricultural imports (15 AD and 5 CV measures), followed by Canada
with 14 (11 AD, 3 CV), and Mexico with 5 (4 AD, 1 CV). Five of Canada’s
measures and 4 of Mexico’s were against U.S. imports, while the United
States had only one active measure against its NAFTA partners agricultural
imports, a price undertaking against Mexican tomatoes.
Comparing active measures on agricultural imports with those on
non-agricultural imports, the sole U.S. measure against Mexican tomatoes
was one of nine total active measures against Mexican imports (Table 8).
Of the eight measures against Canada, none were on agricultural imports.
An investigation against greenhouse tomatoes from Canada was recently
concluded with a finding of no injury. Canada had (as of June 30, 2001)
15 orders in place against the United States, five of which were on agricul-
tural products. In addition, an ongoing Canadian investigation against field
tomato imports from the United States has resulted in a preliminary finding
of dumping. Mexico had (again, as of June 30, 2001) 11 active orders
against the United States, four targeting agricultural exports. Mexico also
has two active investigations against U.S. agricultural imports, one on rice
and a circumvention investigation on beef.
As already mentioned, U.S. orders tend to be longer-lived than
those of Canada and Mexico and this is also the case when considering all
active orders against NAFTA partners. When only agricultural cases are
considered, however, Canada’s measures tend to have the longest dura-
Young,Wainio, and Meilke252 Keeping the Borders Open
Table 7: Agricultural Products with AD or CVD Orders in Place in NAFTA
Countries, as of June 30, 2001.
Type of Order            Commodity Order Date  Exporter
Canada
AD Duty Garlic (Jul-Dec) 1997 China
AD Duty Garlic (Jan-Jun) 2001 China
AD Duty Refined sugar 1995 Denmark
CVD Duty Canned ham 1984 Denmark
CVD Duty Refined sugar 1995 EU
AD Duty Refined sugar 1995 Netherlands
CVD Duty Canned ham 1984 Netherlands
AD Duty Refined sugar 1995 United Kingdom
AD Duty Refined sugar 1995 US
AD Duty Whole potatoes 1984 US
   (non-size A russets)
AD Duty Whole potatoes 1986 US
   (excl. non-size A russets)
AD Duty Iceberg lettuce 1992 US
AD Duty Prepared baby foods 1998 US
AD Duty Garlic 2001 Vietnam
Mexico
CVD Duty Beef 1994 EU
AD Duty High fructose corn syrup 1998 US
AD Duty Swine for slaughter 1999 US
AD Duty Live bovine animals, beef 2000 US
   and edible offals
AD Price Undertaking Apples 1998 US
United States
AD Duty Sugar 1979 Belgium
AD Duty Frozen concentrated orange juice 1987 Brazil
AD Duty Preserved mushrooms 1998 Chile
AD Duty Preserved mushrooms 1999 China
AD Duty Apple juice 2000 China
AD Duty Garlic 1994 China
CVD Duty Sugar 1978 EU
AD Duty Sugar 1979 France
AD Duty Sugar 1979 Germany
AD Duty Preserved mushrooms 1999 India
AD Duty Preserved mushrooms 1999 Indonesia
AD/CVD Duty Raw pistachios, in shell 1986 Iran
CVD Duty Roasted pistachios, in shell 1986 Iran
AD/CVD Duty Certain pasta 1996 Italy
AD Price Undertaking Tomatoes 1996 Mexico
AD Duty Canned pineapple 1995 Thailand
AD/CVD Duty Certain pasta 1996 Turkey
Source: World Trade Organization (2000).253
tion, with an average of almost 10 years, including an active order on
potatoes from the United States that has been in place for 17 years.
Even though the proportion of imports within the NAFTA region
that are subject to AD/CV investigations and definitive duties or undertak-
ings is small, this does not mean that these actions have not imposed sig-
nificant costs on the industries targeted. Table 9 contains trade value data
for most of the agricultural cases investigated within the NAFTA region
over the last 25 years.14 In general, the value of imports increased in the
12-month period immediately preceding the start of an investigation. For
all three NAFTA countries, imports under investigation by another NAFTA
partner totaled about $5.0 billion during the 12 months prior to the initia-
tion of a case. In comparison, imports two years prior to initiation totaled
about $4.6 billion, or about 9 percent less. The largest jump was in two-
way trade between the United States and Mexico. Mexican agricultural
imports subject to investigation by the United States increased by an aver-
age of 19 percent during the 12-month period preceding the investigation.
U.S. exports to Mexico increased by an average of 15 percent prior to
investigation. As expected, in the case of both countries, imports during
the 12 months after the initiation of an investigation declined.
Both AD and CV investigations and ensuing measures tend to be
disproportionately concentrated in a few industries, with agricultural im-
ports on the receiving end in a large number of cases. CUSTA contained a
mechanism for reviewing AD/CV verdicts and, if necessary, remanding
them to the investigating authority if they were found not to have been in
accordance with the imposing country’s laws.15 This mechanism was in-
corporated into NAFTA as well. Prior to the implementation of CUSTA
and NAFTA, final AD, CV and injury determinations could be appealed, in
the United States to the Court of International Trade, in Mexico to the
Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación or, in Canada for certain final determina-
____________________
14  Trade data were not available for Canadian imports of U.S. dry dog food, Christmas
trees, or frozen pot pies and dinners. The trade data in Table 9 is at the HS6 digit level,
which does not always comply exactly with the HS trade lines subject to investigation.
15  In a remand, the panel sends a determination back to the investigating authority
asking it to explain decisions, provide more information or make corrections.
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tions to the Federal Court of Appeal or for some Revenue Canada deci-
sions, to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Chapter 19 of
CUSTA /NAFTA provides for the binational panel review of AD, CV and
injury final determinations as an alternative to judicial review or appeal to
these bodies. Chapter 19 also provides for an “extraordinary challenge
procedure” for appealing panel decisions under certain defined circum-
stances.
Since the creation of these dispute resolution mechanisms, there
have been a total of 25 Chapter 19 cases reviewing final AD/CV determi-
nations on agricultural imports, including two extraordinary challenges.
The United States has been on the defensive side of 15 of these cases, 11
within CUSTA (including the two extraordinary challenges) and four within
NAFTA. Canada has been on the receiving end eight times, four each with
CUSTA and NAFTA, and Mexico twice. There have been cases where a
Table 8: Number and Duration of Active Measures within NAFTA,
June 30, 2001.
 Active Measures Average Duration       Maximum
Total Agricultural Total Agricultural Total Agricultural
United States
  AD Measures
    Canada 6 0 10.0 — 15.3 —
    Mexico 8 1 6.9 4.8 14.5 4.8
  CVD Measures
    Canada 2 0 10.3 — 11.8 —
    Mexico 1 0 7.8 — 7.8 —
Canada
  AD Measures
    US 15 5 7.1 9.9 17.0 17.0
    Mexico 1 0 3.7 — 3.7 —
Mexico
  AD Measures
    US 11 4 3.5 2.3 5.9 3.4
    Canada 0 0 — — — —
Source: Cases - U.S.: U.S. International Trade Administration (1984–2001).
Canada: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (2002).
Mexico: U.S. International Trade Administration (1984–2001);
Also World Trade Organization (2002).255
decision to remand the case to the investigating authorities has resulted in
duties being rescinded. Assuming that the duties would have persisted with-
out the panel’s decision, this has resulted in an increase in bilateral trade.
In summary, the evidence suggests that imposing more restrictive
rules on trade remedy actions within NAFTA would have varied effects on
all three countries, since each is both an extensive initiator and defendant
in these actions. While protection for import-competing industries would
be less available, consumers in the importing country would benefit from
access to relatively cheaper imports as would producers in the exporting
country. The economies, as a whole, of each country would benefit.
In the agricultural sector, the pressure to adjust to increased com-
petition has in some cases resulted in efforts by industry to pursue protec-
tion under trade remedy laws. But, this was the case before the agreements
were in place and there is little evidence to suggest that these actions have
significantly increased in recent years. Nevertheless, even though most of
the trade disputes represent minor irritants that have been addressed through
consultations and negotiations, some have proven to be intractable, occu-
pying a significant portion of the political and bureaucratic agenda in each
country. Some have even persisted in spite of panel decisions rendered
under the dispute resolution mechanisms provided for CUSTA and NAFTA.
It is important to realize, however, that these trade disputes have not neces-
sarily been the result of CUSTA or NAFTA and they may have been worse
without the agreements. The next section explores a number of promising
approaches that could be taken to limit the adverse effects of AD and CV
laws on trade within the NAFTA region.
ALTERNATIVES TO ADMINISTERED PROTECTION
There are a number of alternatives to administered protection in
NAFTA, although any change will face political resistance. The first set of
alternatives involves “tweaking” the current system of administered pro-
tection. The second set involves major changes to the system. Consider-
ation of these potential changes may be enhanced by first defining criteria
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to evaluate the modifications—or answering the question of what we want
to achieve with the changes. We propose seven possible criteria:
• reducing the incidence of trade actions;
• reducing the number of retaliatory actions, those initiated by coun-
tries in response to another countries’ specific investigations;
• reducing the costs of each trade action, including the cost of
conducting the suit and the economic inefficiency due to the
resulting imposition of duties;
• maintaining or increasing the transparency of trade remedies;
• maintaining the ability to protect producers from unfair trade prac-
tices of other countries;
• noting the extent to which trade remedy laws are congruent with
the overarching goals of the free trade area; and
• noting the extent to which modifications to trade remedy laws
assist producers in considering their “domestic” market to be tri-
national rather than national.
The last criterion in particular requires some explanation. Tariffs and other
quantitative barriers to trade in agricultural products were phased out be-
tween 1989 and 1998 for most trade between the United States and
Canada.16 As a consequence, Canada and the United States have a bina-
tional market for most agricultural goods. The transition period for re-
moval of trade barriers between the United States and Mexico will end on
January 1, 2008. Following the transition period the NAFTA members will
share a tri-national market.
The agreement on the creation of a free trade area and the removal
of barriers to trade has occurred more quickly than the development of
supporting paradigms and institutions. This  may be partially due to the
rapidity of change in trade rules and institutions for agriculture both within
North America and within the GATT/WTO. For forty years agriculture was
a special case inside the GATT, and relatively few GATT rules structured
trade or disciplined domestic policies. While the importance of agricul-
____________________
16  Exceptions include Canadian dairy, poultry and eggs, and the United States main-
tains tariffs on Canadian dairy, peanuts and peanut butter, cotton, sugar and sugar-
containing products.259
tural trade was increasing during this time, this trend did not fundamen-
tally challenge the roles of the national government or national agricul-
tural producer groups.
Since the completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations a new set of rules apply to agriculture. National governments
can still subsidize farm income and regulate food safety among other tra-
ditional functions, but rules govern how this can be done if members are to
meet their WTO commitments. These rapid transitions have resulted in
conflicting ideas over the role of the federal government in the market,
with a tension between historic obligations to producers and the obliga-
tions imposed by trade agreements. In addition, efforts to create a bina-
tional market with a harmonious set of rules governing transactions cre-
ates tension between national desires for sovereignty and the control pro-
ducers want to exert over the policies and regulations affecting foreign
governments and their farmers.
Producer groups in the NAFTA market have been slow to create
new institutions, namely bi- or tri-national commodity groups, to accom-
pany the change in their marketplace (Young, 2000). The development of
such institutions may increase the gains to producers from trade liberaliza-
tion within NAFTA, with the gains resulting from co-operation in market
development, research and development, lowering transactions costs of
crossing the border and working jointly on sanitary and phytosanitary is-
sues. The U.S. National Cattlemen’s and Beef Association, the Canadian
Cattlemen’s Association and the Mexican Confederacion Nacional Ganadera
are examples of an industry that has begun to actively pursue co-operative
goals on many fronts. The continued use of administered protection inhib-
its this type of co-operation by emphasizing the importance of the national
market and by stressing relationships between national commodity groups.
As noted in the introduction, economists have long criticized the
use of trade remedies (Loyns, Young and Carter, 2000; Kerr, 2001;
Barichello, 2002), however, politicians and industry groups have insisted
on keeping them to manage the tension created by economic integration.
Tension results when producers perceive that they are competing with dif-
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ferent types and levels of government support or different marketing insti-
tutions. Tensions over differing policies run particularly high when there
are pronounced changes in market share. In the next section we discuss
relatively minor changes that could be made to administered protection
laws to make them less protectionist. We present these options because it
may be politically necessary to keep administered protection as an “es-
cape valve” for managing tension and anti-trade sentiment during the pro-
cess of economic integration. However, we believe that administered pro-
tection may not be the best way to achieve that goal.
Tweaking The Current System
The Trade Remedies Working Group (TRWG) was established by
the NAFTA partners in 1993 to address issues arising from the operation of
trade remedy law. The TRWG notes that the Uruguay Round Agreement
(URA) resulted in significant improvements in disciplines on subsidies
and also in increasing the uniformity of AD processes. The TRWG made a
number of recommendations that member governments agreed to with the
goal of reducing trade irritants between countries including four measures:
• to increase the transparency of proceedings and accessibility of
public records;
• to increase other country’s comments on standing and other fac-
tual matters;
• to simplify dumping calculations; and
• to address a variety of other technical matters relating to admin-
istered protection.
Unfortunately, the TRWG states that they have completed their assignment
and are no longer meeting. However, we argue further changes should be
made.
One option for consideration is to increase the difficulty of meet-
ing the requirements for the imposition of AD and CVs and/or to change
the criteria for the level of the duty. This option could be accomplished by
changing some of the economic definitions used in AD and CV suits. While
members of the WTO are constrained to meet the minimum level of these
definitions, nothing prevents the NAFTA partners from specifying a higher261
standard for the imposition of duties. A gradual increase in the criteria for
the imposition of AD and CV duties could be used as a transition to elimi-
nating their use within the NAFTA. We suggest five possible adjustments
to the definitions:17
Increasing the de minimis level—for AD duties a margin of
dumping of less than two percent of the export price is considered de
minimis. For CVs, a subsidy level of less than one percent ad valorem is
considered de minimis and in that case no duties are imposed. These de
minimis levels could be increased.
Increasing the level of negligible imports— currently, the im-
position of a duty requires that the imported good must be three percent of
the volume of all such merchandise imported into the United States (or
seven percent if a number of suits are initiated on the same day against a
number of countries). This level could be increased on imports from NAFTA
partners.
Restricting the duty to the level sufficient to address injury
instead of the amount required to negate the dumping or subsidy
margin—if the duty required to offset the injury to the domestic industry
is less than the dumping or subsidy margin, (as discussed earlier in the
paper) then the lesser duty could be imposed. This practice has prece-
dence. The Canada/Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement has a provision (Chap-
ter VII Article 2.a) that provides “for the possibility of imposing AD duties
that are less than the full margin of dumping in appropriate circumstances.”
Mexico also has a lesser duty rule (Leycegui, Robson and Stein 1995).
Changing the calculation of duties to account for practices
in the domestic industry.  This modification would be to impose duties
on the difference in practices between the domestic and foreign industry.
For example, if Canadian producers were found to have a subsidy that is
ten percent of the cost of production and U.S. producers are subsidized
____________________
17  
In making these proposals we have generally considered United States rules as
representative of what is done in all three member countries.
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eight percent, then duties would be limited to the difference of two per-
cent.
Including a provision requiring evaluation of the impact of
duties on the general interest of the free trade area.  This provision
would be similar to the public interest provision that exists in Canada and
the European Union. It would require that the broader goals prescribed by
the NAFTA be considered before a determination to impose duties is made.
There is also precedence for this proposal. In Canada, CITT may consider
the potential impact of duties on the public interest as the “concentration
of producer interests is too narrow a focus and consumer interests must be
considered” (Trebilock and Howse 1995, p. 111). However, this provision
is rarely used. The Canada/Costa Rica Free Trade Area does not eliminate
AD cases. It does however, state that “the Parties recognize the desirability
of establishing a domestic process whereby the investigating authorities
can consider, in appropriate circumstances, broader issues of public inter-
est, including the impact of AD duties on other sectors or the domestic
economy and on competition . . .” (Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, 2003) In the European Union, once it has been shown
that there is dumping or subsidization by a third country into the European
Union, and that injury has been caused, before the imposition of duties the
broader interests of the European Union must be evaluated. In the past,
consideration has been given to the maintenance of competition, concern
over the impact of duties on trade relations with other countries, and fi-
nally the impact of duties on related industries.18
Consultations Between Countries.  Currently, NAFTA coun-
tries are not required to engage in consultations before the initiation of
legal action. NAFTA allows each member to continue their use of domes-
tic administered protection processes and, at least for the United States,
administered protection processes do not require consultations. In con-
trast, dispute resolution systems within the WTO and NAFTA stress the
role of consultations between governments before initiating formal inves-
____________________
18  
However, Trebilcock and Howse (1995) state that the European Union uses the
public interest provision only to protect producers from paying more for inputs.263
tigations. For example, within the WTO members must first make a re-
quest for consultations, and if the consultations are not successful, the
complainant can request establishment of a panel. Consultations are confi-
dential and without prejudice to the rights of the member in any further
proceedings. Consultations are likely to involve the following steps:
• clarification of the legal basis for the dispute on the part of the
complainant;
• discussion of why the defending party has maintained the policy
or taken the action in question; and
• exploration and investigation of the options to resolve the con-
flict.
How successful are WTO consultations in resolving disputes? In
July 2001, the WTO considered 51 cases with completed panel reports,
indicating that initial consultations did not resolve the dispute. Thirty-seven
cases were resolved in consultations without proceeding to the request for
establishment of a panel, and another seven cases were resolved during
the panel process before a formal report was adopted. Hence, nearly one-
half of the complaints were resolved through consultations. Three examples
of cases settled without a panel report include:
• the U.S. complaint against Denmark on measures affecting the
enforcement of intellectual property rights;
• the Thai complaint against Colombia on the safeguard measures
on imports of plain polyester filaments from Thailand; and
• the U.S. complaint against Greece on the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights for motion pictures and of the WTO’s dis-
pute resolution system on that matter.
Already, consultations are occasionally used between NAFTA parties dur-
ing AD and CV investigations. The governments of the United States and
Canada have consulted at different times during the long-standing soft-
wood lumber dispute (Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, 2002). This proposal would make consultations a mandatory part
of the process for resolving AD and CV suits.
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If consultations were adopted as a preliminary step in resolving
administered protection complaints, a process for consultations would need
to be developed. One important question affecting the success of consulta-
tions is the scope of the parties included in the process. Would only the
complainants be allowed to make presentations, or would the process al-
low for the inclusion of parties representing the broader public interest?
Principles for consultations could be established to ensure that managed
trade is not the outcome.
The changes in administered protection processes suggested in this
section do not require major changes to the current practice, although
making consultations a mandatory part of the procedure would involve
legislative change. In the next section we consider a range of radical
changes. The options range from the complete elimination of administered
protection within NAFTA to the alternatives of “good offices” and manda-
tory facilitated dialogue.
Radical Changes To The Administered Protection System
One radical option for change is to eliminate AD suits within NAFTA
entirely, as Canada attempted to do when negotiating a free trade area
(FTA) with the United States (Kerr 2000). Other FTAs have eliminated the
option to press dumping suits, notably Australia and New Zealand within
the trans-Tasman market:
In an open trans-Tasman market, the different thresholds
for anti-dumping and competition laws would have led to
the protection of relatively inefficient industries in the trans-
Tasman context and hence would have hampered the effi-
cient allocation of resources between the  two countries.
Moreover, it was felt that the removal of trade barriers would
make dumping increasingly redundant as the scope for price
discrimination between the domestic and export markets
was reduced, and the risk of retaliation by competitors in-
creased.  Continuation of the anti-dumping remedy would
also have enhanced the possibilities for prolonged dispu-265
tation at an official level to the detriment of a beneficial
commercial relationship.” 19
Other FTAs such as the Canada/Chile FTA have eliminated the use
of AD measures within their FTA. Furthermore, the Canada/Chile FTA es-
tablished a committee with the view to eliminating the need for CVs as
well. Another goal of this committee is to work with other like-minded
countries to remove the application of AD measures in FTAs (Article M-05
of the Canada/Chile Agreement). The political difficulty of eliminating
administered protection processes within the European Union may have
been lessened by the existence of their Common Agricultural Policy and
the fact that the European Union is a customs union.20 In contrast, fierce
political opposition has been expressed to the elimination of administered
protection processes by U.S. legislators (Kerr 2001).
Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes. Among other radi-
cal changes to administered protection processes is the introduction of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The U.S. government and the Cana-
dian federal and provincial governments have adopted ADR for use in a
variety of contexts. Within NAFTA, ADR is recognized as a valuable tool
for the resolution of private commercial disputes (Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, 2001).
ADR processes usually involve a third neutral party which
has no stake in the outcome. The goal of ADR is to encourage communi-
cation, and to leave litigation as a last resort. The literature in dispute reso-
lution suggests the following criteria when considering the introduction of
ADR:
• does the current system produce acceptable and durable out-
comes?
• what are the costs of the current system and are they acceptable?
____________________
19   (Leycegui, Robson and Stein 1995, p. 210).
20  The European Union has also eliminated AD suits between member states. As the
European Union is a customs union with a Common Agricultural Policy, this case has
different characteristics than NAFTA.
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• what is the impact of the current systems on the relationships
between the parties and to what extent are the relationships val-
ued?
• are the disputants involved in the generation of the solutions to
the dispute or is that function given to a separate authority?
These questions may be useful to policymakers concerned with whether
or not to modify existing AD and CV processes.
While ADR includes a wide variety of options, two processes are
suggested for incorporation into a dispute resolution system for adminis-
tered protection cases: “good offices,”  and mediation between the indus-
try pressing the suit and the industry under investigation. Before these two
processes are considered in detail, a hypothesis on the causes of adminis-
tered protection suits and the characteristics of dispute resolution systems
are considered.
Hypotheses On The Motivations For Initiating A Suit
Six possible motivations exist for pressing an AD or CV suit:
• the actual evidence of dumping or subsidies;
• low prices and import surges;
• changes in industry structure;
• misinformation;
• differing policies, regulations and marketing structures; and
• leadership bids within commodity organizations.21
Of these six, the perceptions held by producers about the advan-
tages given to their competitors due to differing government subsidies and
policies may be most critical. As indicated in Figure 3, some of these fac-
tors may feed into the tension that motivates the suit; however, AD and CV
processes are limited to the determinations of dumping and/or injury. Out-
comes are limited to the imposition of a duty or not, and many of the other
____________________
21  
This hypothesis has been discussed with Chuck Lambert of the U.S. National
Cattlemen’s Beef Association and he was supportive of this view. Other industry groups
are being approached to validate or to correct this proposition. Rice (2000) offers
further support in his assessment.267
causal factors remain unaffected by the outcome. Because many of the
tensions underlying the dispute are not alleviated, the suit may occur again.
This hypothesis is supported by the number of repetitive suits and investi-
gations that exist in some industries, for example, cattle and grains (Young,
2000) and hogs (Meilke and van Duren, 1990). In the recent tomato dis-
pute (Barichello in this publication), a suit filed by the U.S. tomato indus-
try against Canadian greenhouse tomatoes promptly motivated a Cana-
dian suit against the U.S. fresh tomato industry. Another example is the
Mexican action against U.S. beef exports filed during consideration of a
U.S. AD suit against the Mexican beef industry.
Characteristics Of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems
If an ADR system is being considered to replace administered pro-
tection, it is useful to consider the five common elements of such a system:
Assessment of the resolution options. The complainants as-
sess the conflict and identify the stakeholders, as well as the economic,
political and legal issues. The processes available for the resolution of the
dispute may be evaluated, and the cost and the timeliness of different op-
Figure 3: Factors Leading to an AD and CVD Dispute.
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tions may constrain choices. Currently, administered protection does not
offer a choice of dispute resolution processes to disputants.
Identification of the interests and the development of the
agenda of issues. Identifying the interests (needs) Disreali once said, “I
serve your interests and not your desires” underlying a group’s positions is
critical to a successful resolution of the conflict. The industry may have
one set of interests around the dispute and another broader set of general
interests. The general interests of the group pressing the suit may include
access to other NAFTA markets, avoidance of a countersuit, a general de-
escalation of the use of trade remedies, regulatory and policy harmoniza-
tion within NAFTA, increased demand for their product, trade liberaliza-
tion generally, and a unified domestic industry. Administered protection
processes are centered on the criteria for imposing duties and do not iden-
tify or evaluate a broader set of interests.
Fact finding—may include an analysis of the data needs of the
stakeholders for successful resolution of the conflict. Joint fact finding
stresses the importance of all parties being involved in defining questions
requiring additional data, and how data will be collected and interpreted
(Adler et al., 2001; Environmental Protection Agency, 1999). The goal of
joint fact finding is to avoid the use of “duelling experts” hired by one side
and distrusted by the other, and instead to use methods and experts that all
parties agree upon. In administered protection processes, fact finding oc-
curs through a rigidly structured process. Public input is accepted, but
stakeholders have no ability to influence the course of the prescribed in-
vestigation. Frustration has been frequently expressed over the criteria for
a positive assessment of dumping, indicating a lack of respect for the pro-
cess on the part of both participants and analysts.
Collaborative problem solving—along with fact finding may
occur in iterations as the investigation leads to the generation of new op-
tions. Stakeholder groups may work collaboratively in generating options
that will best meet the interests of all participants. This may also involve
stakeholders consulting with their constituent groups over the desirability269
of various outcomes. In administered protection processes, the possible
outcomes are predetermined, with a duty being imposed or not.
Settlement. It involves negotiation and agreement by parties over
the options for resolution of the dispute. In administered protection pro-
cesses, even if a duty is imposed, trade tension almost certainly continues
to exist and may well increase.
One point of the description above is to illuminate that adminis-
tered protection does not have the characteristics of an ADR, but may
more aptly be considered an administrative review. The process of adjudi-
cation does not assist groups in identifying their interests, nor does it in-
volve them in generating options to advance those interests. The proposals
made here to include good offices and mediation are meant to supplement
the current process of administrative review.
Good Offices
“Good offices” are used when a third party works to correct mis-
understandings, to reduce fear and mistrust and to increase communica-
tion. Good offices stop short of mediation as they do not involve formal
negotiation. The use of good offices takes a variety of forms. Within the
WTO, the Director-General may offer his good offices with a view to as-
sisting members to settle a dispute. A similar role is frequently taken by the
UN Secretary General who uses his good offices (generally meaning the
weight and prestige of the world community he represents) to undertake
efforts publicly or privately to prevent international disputes from devel-
oping, escalating or spreading. In some cases, a good offices commission
has been established and any of the members can be called on to offer
their services to resolve disputes.
The success of a good offices commission within NAFTA would
depend critically on the use of commissioners who were effective in their
role, who could act effectively as neutral parties, while working with in-
dustries to foster the communication required for collaborative problem
solving. It is envisioned that industry could request the services of a good
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offices commissioner to seek an early resolution of its dispute. This pro-
cess is proposed to be voluntary, less formal and less structured than the
proposal for facilitated dialog discussed below.
Mandatory Facilitated Dialogue
The proposal of mandatory facilitated dialogue is to have the com-
plainants engage in a dialogue with all stakeholders, facilitated by a neu-
tral party, before the national administered protection agencies for all NAFTA
partners can investigate a suit. Facilitated dialogue is a type of mediation
the purpose of which is to explore issues, interests and options. It is how-
ever, less geared toward negotiation and settlement than mediation. The
purpose of the facilitated dialogue is to engage the complainant in a wide-
ranging discussion on the consequences, costs and benefits, widely de-
fined, of pursuing the suit. The underlying premise is that the complaining
industry may have higher opportunity costs than the substantial amount of
money and effort required to launch a suit. These opportunity costs are
detailed below. Participants would include the industry under investigation
and other stakeholders in the domestic industry. If the domestic industry is
divided about whether or not to initiate the suit, all relevant divisions in the
domestic industry would need to be included.
A discussion of the costs and benefits of the suit might include three
topics:
• whether or not the defending industry is likely to retaliate by
initiating a suit through its own domestic AD and CV process.
Such retaliatory suits occur with enough frequency to be a con-
sideration;
• if the domestic industry is divided on the question of the suit,
particularly the leadership of commodity organizations, discus-
sion is needed about the cost to the domestic industry of pro-
ceeding with a divisive action;
• discussion is needed about how the industries might gain from
co-operation on issues of joint concern and the possible impact
of the suit on progress toward cooperative goals and the relation-
ships involved. It has been observed that progress on these is-
sues may be halted during the course of the AD and CV actions.271
Another important element of the facilitated dialogue would be to
correct misinformation that might exist, particularly on the costs of pro-
duction in both (or all three) countries, and differences in policies and
marketing systems that affect returns to producers. This question might
need to be addressed through a joint fact finding effort, in which all par-
ticipants define the question, what data are needed, and how to interpret
the data. An investigation that is jointly devised and that has the respect of
all parties may be instrumental in addressing the problem of misinforma-
tion that is widely recognized to form an important part of trade tension.
In-depth, face-to-face discussions may yield other benefits. For
example, the ironic fact that if the defending industry is selling at less than
the cost of production (as input and output prices across the border are
highly correlated), it is likely that the complaining industry may also be
engaging in the same practice to some degree. The ability of commodity
groups to reach this level of honesty and to have it affect their negotiations
will depend critically on the skill of the facilitator and the vision of the
industry held by its representatives.
Some disputes have three characteristics that favor the use of mediation:
• the outcome of litigation is unknown which would appear to be
the case as for administered protection cases. The statistics for
U.S. AD and CV cases between 1980 and 199822 are:
- Title VII cases—positive 35%, negative 39%, terminated 25%
- AD cases—positive 42%, negative 36.5%, terminated 22%
- CV cases—positive 23%, negative 45%, and terminated 32%.
These percentages are based on the number of cases, not the value of
imports.
• the parties are interdependent. The degree of interdependence
between parties will vary by industry. Some industries may place
a high value on the maintenance of relationships across the bor-
der within the industry and the up- or down-stream segments of
the industry, and between commodity groups and governments;
____________________
22  U.S. International Trade Commission 1999.
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• issues are clearly identifiable and there are multiple issues, al-
lowing give and takeand trade-offs between parties.
Five factors impede the success of mediation as a tool for resolving dis-
putes:
• parties do not have on-going relationships;
• one party has an easier way to meet its needs;
• parties are under outside pressure to fight;
• too much or not enough urgency; and
• mandated participation in mediation.
The purpose of facilitated dialogue is to assist the complainant in
making a comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of pressing an
AD or CV suit. If the complainants proceed to press the suit, the outcome
may still include education for all parties on the other’s interests, increased
knowledge of the potential for collaboration, familiarity with other country’s
industry leaders, and a clearer picture of the likely consequences of press-
ing the suit. If the complainants decide after the facilitated dialogue not to
press the suit, then all of the proceeding advantages apply, as well as a
reduction in the incidence and costs of the trade remedies.
An important question is whether the facilitated dialogues should
be mandatory or voluntary. Mediation is argued to have the highest chance
of success when all parties enter the process voluntarily. However, there is
ample precedence for mediation that is mandatory. In many situations when
mediation is mandated and no agreement is reached, the case will proceed
to litigation, or in this case, to administrative review. Given the history of
AD and CV in the United States and the proclivity of parties to use it -- it is
likely that the domestic industry may be reluctant to engage in this process
on a voluntary basis.
CONCLUSIONS
Domestic industries have the opportunity to pursue administered
protection within NAFTA, even though the reduction or the elimination of
tariffs has largely eliminated the ability of firms to price discriminate be-273
tween national markets. This means that the rational for dumping, widely
considered theoretically weak to begin with, has become even weaker with
the implementation of NAFTA.
An examination of the data on AD and CVD suits between NAFTA
parties indicates lower tariffs have not resulted in an explosion of adminis-
tered protection. In fact, during most of the 1984 to 2001 period, NAFTA
members were subject to fewer investigations by their NAFTA partners
than their import shares might suggest. Since the agreement, Mexico has
increased the frequency of its suits, but the United States and Canada have
not. The agreement appears to have moderated, overall, the incidence of
trade remedy actions between countries. However, with 22 percent of cases
initiated, agriculture is responsible for a substantially higher percentage of
cases than its import share.
While it is true that the number of suits has not increased dramati-
cally with the elimination of most tariffs, this conference and previous
ones have discussed in detail the cost of AD and CV suits. Authors have
been critical of the motivations prompting the suits, the criteria used to
determine the outcomes, the trade-dampening effects of a suit in progress,
and the economic inefficiency caused by the imposition of duties. In Canada
duties are imposed in 70 percent of the investigations, and in over 50 per-
cent of the cases in the United States and Mexico, These odds make it
extremely difficult to find a constituency with the political will to change
the system, despite the economic costs and the impact these suits have on
the commercial and governmental relationships that are critical to achiev-
ing the goals of the FTA.
If a constituency exits that believes that the current system does
not produce acceptable outcomes, then the next question is what goals
should be pursued in the adoption of a new process for resolving AD and
CV complaints? How important are possible goals of cost and incident
reduction, transparency of resolution processes, and the promotion of com-
mercial ties between NAFTA partners?










































The options for the modification of administered protection pro-
cesses are evaluated according to the criteria presented earlier (Table 10).
Options 1–3 would reduce either the size of the duty or the likelihood of its
imposition. Option 4, requiring consideration of the interests of the FTA, is
difficult to evaluate because it is poorly defined in an operational sense,
and the literature indicates that this clause has been ineffective in other
venues. The removal of AD and CV suits meets all criteria with the pos-
sible exception of maintaining the ability to protect producers. The caveat
is that safeguard provisions do offer some automatic protection to produc-
ers from import surges, but not specifically from dumping.
Requiring consultations, the use of good offices, and facilitated
dialogue all may reduce the incidence of suits (and thus their overall cost)
by terminating the suit before it progresses to administrative review. These
options score poorly on transparency, as these processes are unlikely to be
open to the public and by their nature are poorly suited to rigid guidelines.
However, best practices and guidelines could be developed. These three
processes are appropriate if an implicit goal is to strengthen relationships
between industries. By doing so they assist in a paradigm shift to a trinational
market, which in itself should reduce the incidence of AD and CV suits
between NAFTA partners.
However, to the extent that AD and CV processes are used as an
escape valve for the tensions inherent in economic integration, it is more
appropriate to try to reduce the likelihood of conflict at an earlier stage.
The NAFTA agreement did set up a number of working groups to address
issues of economic integration, but much remains to be done. It would be
useful to offer an array of ADR processes for industries to manage ten-
sions and to work through issues that are unconnected to AD/CD pro-
cesses. This array could include good offices, facilitated dialogue and
mediation offered to industries through the NAFTA secretariat.
Political opposition has thwarted past attempts to eliminate AD and
CV suits within the context of NAFTA. This paper has explored the fre-
quency of suits within the agricultural sector and has offered some ideas
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about how to reduce the cost of the current system by supplementing it
with other options for resolving these disputes.
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APPENDIX
Table A1:  Bilateral AD/CVD Actions Within NAFTA Against Food and
Agricultural Exports, 1984-2001, follows on the next page.281
Final 
Product Initiation Determination Final Duty Dispute Resolution 1/ Current Status
Canada's Investigations of  U.S. Imports
Fresh Tomatoes (AD) 11/9/2001 Investigation underway
Grain Corn (AD) 8/9/2000 3/7/2001 Finding of no injury
Grain Corn (CVD) 8/9/2000 3/7/2001 Finding of no injury
Baby Food Products (AD) 10/3/1997 4/29/1998 59.76% NAFTA panel (1) AD Measure in effect
Refined Sugar (AD) 3/17/1995 11/6/1995 43.86% NAFTA panel (1) AD Measure in effect
Refined Sugar (CVD) 3/17/1995 7/7/1995 Finding of no subsidy
Apples, Red Delicious (AD) 7/14/1994 2/9/1995 28.00% NAFTA panel (1)* Order revoked 02/08/00
             Golden Delicious (AD) Finding of no injury
Tomato Paste (AD) 9/1/1992 3/30/1993 CUSFTA panel (1)* Finding of no injury
Cauliflower (AD) 6/30/1992 1/4/1993 Finding of no injury
Iceberg Lettuce (AD) 6/8/1992 11/30/1992 31.00% Order revoked 04/22/02
Christmas Trees (AD) 11/15/1991 3/30/1992 Finding of no dumping
Malt Beverages - Beer (AD ) 3/6/1991 10/2/1991 29.80% CUSFTA & NAFTA panels (4) Order revoked 12/2/94
Dry Dog Food (AD) 3/28/1990 Terminated 6/25/90
Apples (AD) 7/8/1988 2/3/1989 27.45% Order revoked 02/07/94
Sour Cherries (AD) 6/21/1988 N/A 35.36% Order revoked 01/29/94
Yellow Onions (AD) 10/14/1986 4/30/1987 42.58% Order revoked 05/21/97
Grain Corn (CVD) 7/2/1986 3/6/1987 54.00% Order revoked - 03/05/92
Potatoes - Non-russet Whole (AD) 10/18/1985 4/18/1986 32.40% AD Measure in effect
Frozen Pot Pies & Dinners (AD) 4/24/1985 7/4/1988 Price undertaking; now expired
Sugar (AD) 10/24/1983 4/24/1984 Finding of no injury
Potatoes - Russet Whole (AD) 9/30/1983 6/4/1984 N/A AD Measure in effect
Mexico's Investigations of  U.S. Imports
Long-grained Milled Rice (AD) 12/11/2000 Investigation underway
Bovine Meat (AD Circumvention) 9/29/2000 Investigation underway
Live Swine (AD) 10/21/1998 10/20/1999 $.351/kg (48.13%) AD Measure in effect
Slaughter Cattle, Frsh & Frzn Beef (AD) 10/21/1998 4/8/2000 12-76%-214.52% NAFTA panel (active) AD Measure in effect
High Fructose Corn Syrup  1/23/1998 9/8/1998
Grade 90 (AD Circumvention) $55.37-$90.36/mt AD Measure in effect
Apples, Red & Golden Delicious (AD) 3/6/1997 5/15/1998 $.72/kg Price undertaking in effect
High Fructose Corn Syrup (AD) 2/27/1997 12/26/1997 NAFTA panel (active)
Grade 42 $63.75-$100.60/mt AD Measure in effect
Grade 55 $55.37-$175.50/mt AD Measure in effect
Bovine Meat (AD) 6/3/1994 Petition withdrawn 04/25/96
Wheat (CVD) 4/4/1994 3/7/1996 Finding of no subsidy
Various Pork Products (AD) 1/25/1993 8/26/1994 Finding of no injury
U.S. Investigations of Canada's Imports
Greenhouse Tomatoes (AD) 4/17/2001 4/10/2002 Finding of no injury
Live Cattle (AD) 12/30/1998 11/17/1999 Finding of no injury
Live Cattle (CVD) 12/30/1998 10/21/1999 NAFTA panel (2)* Finding of no subsidy 
Fresh Chilled & Frozen Pork (CVD) 2/3/1989 7/24/1989 N/A CUSFTA panel (5) Order revoked 06/27/91
Fresh Cut Flowers (AD) 6/17/1986 1/20/1987 N/A Order revoked 06/18/93
Fresh Cut Flowers (CVD) 6/17/1986 1/20/1987 N/A Order revoked 01/01/93
Red Raspberries (CVD) 8/12/1985 1/9/1986 N/A Investigation suspended 01/09/86; 
Terminated 10/09/91
Live Swine & Frsh, Chll'd & Frzn Pork (CVD) 11/30/1984 6/17/1985 CUSFTA & NAFTA panels (6)
Live Swine (other than slaughter animals) $.02602/lb Order revoked 11/04/99
Slaughter Sows & Boars $.02602/lb Order revoked 08/29/96
Dressed Wt. Swine $.03272/lb Order revoked 11/04/99
Frsh, Chll'd & Frzn Pork Finding of no subsidy
Red Raspberries (AD) 7/30/1984 5/10/1985 0%-22.76% CUSFTA panel (1) Order revoked 02/26/99
Sugar & Syrup (AD) 4/30/1979 11/8/1979 $.010105-$.0237/lb Order revoked 10/28/99
Instant Potato Granules (AD) 9/28/1971 6/7/1972 N/A Order revoked 07/31/87
U.S. Investigations of Mexico's Imports
Table Grapes (AD) 5/15/2001 6/15/2001 Finding of no injury
Live Cattle (AD) 12/30/1998 1/19/1999 Finding of no injury
Tomatoes (AD) 4/25/1996 11/1/1996 Price undertaking in effect
From 10/23 to 06/30 $.2108/lb
From 07/01 to 10/22 $.172/lb
Fresh Cut Flowers (AD) 6/17/1986 3/3/1987 0%-29.4% NAFTA panel (1) Order revoked 10/15/96
Fresh Cut Flowers (CVD) 10/26/1983 4/16/1984 Finding of no subsidy
Table A1: Bilateral AD/CVD Actions Within NAFTA Against Food and
Agricultural Exports, 1984-2001.
1/  Number of panel cases in parentheses.
*   Terminated, no decision issued
Source:  Cases - U.S.: International Trade Administration Database (http://ia.ita.doc.gov/); Canada: Special Import Measures Act
Database  (http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/customs/business/sima/historic-e.html); Mexico: The Year in Trade (ITC publication), various
years; Also, WTO - Members’ semi-annual reports to the Committees on Antidumping Practices and Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tratop_e.htm)
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